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ENDING UNFAIR ARBITRATION: FIGHTING
AGAINST THE ENFORCEMENT OF ARBITRATION
AGREEMENTS IN LONG-TERM CARE
CONTRACTS*
By Kelly Bagby** and Samantha Souzam
AARP Foundation Litigation""
INTRODUCTION
Although provisions requiring nursing facility residents to agree to
mandatory pre-dispute arbitration are now ubiquitous, many courts have
refused to enforce these provisions and have adopted a variety of legal
arguments to do so. Arbitration can be expensive and biased in favor of the
nursing facility. It limits access to courts, discovery, available remedies and
precedential value of decisions. Oftentimes, only after a nursing facility's
negligence has caused a resident severe injury or death, does the resident or
family member discover that, upon admission to the nursing facility or
during their stay, the resident became bound to settle disputes in arbitration,
ostensibly giving up the resident's constitutional right to a jury trial. While
arbitration clearly benefits the corporation operating the nursing facility,
mandatory pre-dispute arbitration can be detrimental to a nursing facility
resident who has been harmed by the actions or inactions of the facility.
This Article will discuss the many tools litigators have to challenge the
enforcement of arbitration agreements for nursing facility clients.
Additionally, this article will examine proactive ways elder law attorneys
can help clients avoid the enforcement of pre-dispute arbitration in the first
place. Part I will provide the legal context for arbitration agreements. Part
II will address the different strategies litigators have to challenge
enforcement of binding arbitration agreements.
* The opinions expressed in this article are those of the authors and do not reflect the
official positions of AARP or AARP Foundation.
Kelly Bagby is Senior Attorney at AARP Foundation Litigation. She works on quality
of care and civil rights issues for nursing facility residents throughout the country. She
can be reached at kbagby@aarp.org.
Samantha Souza is graduating in spring 2013 from the Georgetown University Law
Center's LLM Program in Taxation with a certificate in estate planning.
Former AFL intern Brendan Pilver contributed mightily to the content of this article.
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I. THE LEGAL CONTEXT OF ARBITRATION AGREEMENTS
The Federal Arbitration Act of 1925 ("FAA")' is the key federal law
regarding arbitration agreements, including those related to nursing
facilities. The FAA states that
[a] written provision in . . . a contract evidencing a transaction
involving commerce to settle by arbitration a controversy
thereafter arising out of such contract or transaction . . . shall be
valid, irrevocable, and enforceable, save upon such grounds as
2
exist at law or in equity for the revocation of any contract.
Historically, the United States Supreme Court interpreted the FAA
narrowly, only applying it to interstate commercial transactions among
merchants, thus protecting consumers from binding arbitration. The Court
initially interpreted the FAA as a federal procedural rule inapplicable in state
court; however, the Court's interpretation of the FAA has shifted over time.
In 1995, in Allied-Bruce Terminix Cos. v. Dobson, the Court expanded its
reading of the FAA and ruled that the statute extends to the limits of
Congress's Commerce Clause powers, by applying to agreements that in fact
have an effect on interstate commerce and preempting state anti-arbitration
statutes. 3
For instance, the Court recently struck down a state court's decision
categorically invalidating nursing facility arbitration agreements as a matter
of state public policy. In Marmet Health Care Center v. Brown, the United
States Supreme Court vacated the West Virginia Supreme Court's judgment
that, "as a matter of public policy under West Virginia law, an arbitration
clause in a nursing home admission agreement adopted prior to an
occurrence of negligence that results in a personal injury or wrongful death,
shall not be enforced to compel arbitration of a dispute concerning the
negligence.' The Supreme Court found that "West Virginia's prohibition
against pre-dispute agreements to arbitrate personal-injury or wrongful-death
claims against nursing homes is a categorical rule prohibiting arbitration of
a particular type of claim, and that rule is contrary to the terms and coverage
1. 9 U.S.C. §§ 1, et seq (2006).
2. 9 U.S.C. § 2 (2006).
3. Allied-Bruce Terminix Cos. v. Dobson, 513 U.S. 265, 281 (1995).
4. Marmet Health Care Ctr. v. Brown, 132 S. Ct. 1201, 1203 (quoting Brown ex rel.
Brown v. Genesis Healthcare Corp., 724 S.E.2d 250 (W. Va. 2011), vacated by Marmet,
132 S. Ct. 1201 (2012)) (internal quotation marks omitted).
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of the FAA." The Court in Marmet went on to find that while the FAA
preempts West Virginia's categorical policy stance, the state court on
remand must consider whether the challenged arbitration clauses are
otherwise invalid, revocable, and unenforceable "upon such grounds as exist
at law or in equity for the revocation of any contract," as required by the
statute.6
Although the Supreme Court admonished the Marmet court for ignoring
the FAA, other courts around the country have invalidated nursing facility
arbitration agreements without running afoul of the FAA, provided the
grounds relied upon were consistent with standard contract defenses.
II. MANDATORY PRE-DISPUTE ARBITRATION FOR NURSING FACILITY
RESIDENTS Is FUNDAMENTALLY UNFAIR BECAUSE OF THE IMBALANCE IN
BARGAINING POWER
Decisions regarding admission into a nursing facility are "emotionally-
charged, stress-laden event[s]," typically made in the midst of a crisis
brought on by an abrupt increase in disability level, precipitous deterioration
in health, or the deterioration in health (or death) of a spouse or caregiver.7
Intrinsically, contracting for placement in a nursing home suggests that
the future resident seeking care will be of progressed age, possibly
diminished capacity, that the agreement will be drafted by the nursing home,
and that the business acumen of the resident will be inadequate to protect the
rights extinguished by the arbitration agreement.
New nursing facility residents and their families, urgent to get help for
themselves or their loved ones, routinely sign arbitration agreements as a
precondition for admission, only to learn later that the contract includes
5. Id. at 1203-04 (citing AT&T Mobility LLC v. Concepcion, 131 S. Ct. 1740, 1747
(2011)) (emphasis added).
6. 9 U.S.C. § 2 (2006); Marmet, 132 S. Ct. at 1204.
7. See Podolsky v. First Healthcare Corp., 58 Cal. Rptr. 2d 89, 101 (Ct. App. 1996);
Donna Ambrogi, Legal Issues in Nursing Home Admissions, 18 LAW MED. & HEALTH
CARE 254, 255 (1990); Marshall B. Kapp, The "Voluntary" Status of Nursing Facility
Admissions: Legal, Practical, and Public Policy Implications, 24 NEW ENG. J. CRIM. &
Civ. CONFINEMENT 1, 3 (1998) (explaining that an older person's move to a nursing
facility often follows a period of acute hospitalization when she or her family cannot
manage home care demands).
8. Jana Pavlic, Reverse Pre-empting the Federal Arbitration Act: Alleviating the
Arbitration Crisis in Nursing Homes, 22 J.L. & HEALTH 375, 385 (2009).
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provisions requiring the resident and family to forego the use of courts to
resolve a wide range of future disputes that, all too often, involve abuse,
assault, malnutrition, neglect, or even death.9 People seeking admission to a
long-term care facility are focusing on the quality and range of services
available, and perhaps the costs, but are not thinking about possible future
disputes. o
The arbitration agreements that result from these inherently and grossly
unequal bargains are having a dramatic effect on the rights of nursing
facility residents. Including, as the Wall Street Journal noted, decreasing
restitution for an increasing number of reported abuses:
Nursing-home patients and their families are increasingly giving
up their right to sue over disputes about care, including those
involving deaths, as the homes write binding arbitration into their
standard contracts. The clause can have profound implications.
Nursing homes' average costs to settle cases have begun dropping,
according to an industry study, even as claims of poor treatment
are on the rise."
Thus, the crisis that precipitates nursing facility admission often
overwhelms new residents, leading them to execute agreements
relinquishing their right to a jury trial at a time when they are not in the right
9. Laura M. Owings & Mark N. Geller, The Inherent Unfairness of Arbitration
Agreements in Nursing Home Admission Contracts, 43 TENN. B.J. 20, 20 (2007).
10. See Ann E. Krasuski, Mandatory Arbitration Agreements Do Not Belong in
Nursing Home Contracts with Residents, 8 DEPAUL J. HEALTH CARE L. 263, 280 (2004)
("Admitting a loved one to a nursing home is an overwhelming and stressful undertaking
for families . . . . If families give any thought to the admissions agreement they are
signing, they probably do not consider whether it contains a mandatory arbitration
agreement.").
11. Nathan Koppel, Nursing Homes, in Bid to Cut Costs, Prod Patients to Forgo
Lawsuits-Big Payouts Fade As Arbitration Rises; Ms. Hight Falls Ill, WALL ST. J., Apr.
11, 2008, at Al. The article quotes former Sen. Mel Martinez, "'[i]t is an unfair practice
given the unequal bargaining position between someone desperate to find a place for their
loved ones and a large corporate entity like a nursing home."' Id. Moreover, the article
notes that "[t]he biggest arbitration provider, the American Arbitration Association,
frowns on agreements requiring arbitration in disputes over nursing-home care and
generally refuses such cases. Some patients 'really are not in an appropriate state of mind
to evaluate an agreement like an arbitration clause,' says Eric Tuchmann, the
association's general counsel. A second group, the American Health Lawyers
Association, also avoids them." Id.
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frame of mind to contemplate properly the impact of such provisions. As
one court put it:
The fact that a resident is signing an arbitration agreement
contemporaneously with being admitted into a nursing home is
troubling. By definition, an individual being admitted into a
nursing home has a physical or mental detriment that requires
them to need the assistance of a nursing home. Further, the reality
is that, for many individuals, their admission to a nursing home is
the final step in the road of life. As such, this is an extremely
stressful time for elderly persons of diminished health. In most
circumstances, it will be difficult to conclude that such an
individual has equal bargaining power with a corporation that,
through corporate counsel, drafted the form contract at issue. 12
Given the disparity in bargaining power and knowledge between the
nursing facility and the resident during the admission process, it is important
to ensure that the agreements between the nursing facility and its residents
are not unconscionable. It is difficult for residents and their families, faced
with the crises accompanying admission to a nursing facility, to make
informed decisions about the numerous provisions contained in an
admissions contract-especially provisions requiring nursing facility
residents to waive the right to access the courts and to a trial by jury for
future disputes.
The need to find a long-term care placement arises quickly and is often
unplanned, leaving little time to investigate options or to wait for an opening
at a facility of one's choice.13 Time pressure significantly impairs the ability
to seek and carefully consider alternatives, and the critical need for services
almost always overshadows any other consideration. In the 1980s, the
federal government changed the way hospitals are paid for their Medicare
patients, and since that change, hospital discharge planning occurs "quicker
and sicker."l 4  Hospitalization itself can be quite debilitating and the
12. Manley v. Personacare, 2007 Ohio 343, T 29 (Ohio Ct. App. Jan. 26, 2007)
(quoting Lisa Tripp, A Senior Moment: The Executive Branch Solution to the Problem of
Binding Arbitration Agreements in Nursing Home Admission Contracts, 31 CAMPBELL L.
REv. 157, 172 (2009)).
13. Denese A. Vlosky et al., "Say-so" as a Predictor of Nursing Home Readiness,
93 J. FAM. & CONSUMER SCI. 59 (2001).
14. Linda S. Whitton, Navigating the Hazards of the Eldercare Continuum, 6 J.
MENTAL HEALTH & AGING 145, 148 (2000) (internal quotation marks omitted). Recent
studies indicate that the proportion of elderly long-term nursing facility residents has
decreased over the last two decades. JUDITH KASPER, ET AL., CHANGES IN
CHARACTERISTICS, NEEDS, AND PAYMENT FOR CARE OF ELDERLY: NURSING HOME
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assessment of the type of long-term care they need after discharge is made
before they have fully recovered and are able to make informed decisions on
these critical issues.'5 Consequently, the hospital patient is often unable to
review the contract and contemplate the meaning and ramifications of its
provisions, particularly those that have nothing to do with care and related
services and costs.' 6
III. SUCCESSFUL STRATEGIES FOR CHALLENGING ENFORCEMENT OF
ARBITRATION AGREEMENTS
In recent years, an increasing number of courts have refused to enforce
provisions of agreements that mandate arbitration against nursing facility
residents. These courts have generally struck down the arbitration
provisions for one of the following reasons: (1) lack of capacity of the
nursing facility resident to make a contract; (2) lack of authority of the
person signing the agreement on behalf of the nursing facility resident; (3)
inapplicability of the agreement to third parties; and (4) unconscionability of
the agreement.
RESIDENTS: 1999 To 2004, 1 (2007). Specifically in the past five years, elderly long-stay
nursing facility residents, those staying for 90 days or more, has declined from 1.21
million to 1.06 million. Id. However, even though the number of residents staying in
nursing facilities for long periods has gone down, the population appears to be sicker. Id.
In 1999, 63% of recently admitted elderly residents, residents for 30 days or less, had one
or more of the five recognized physical diagnoses and 27% had one or more mental or
cognitive impairments, compared with 69% and 34% in 2004, respectively. Id. at 9
(identifying the five physical diagnoses as Chronic Obstructive Pulmonary Disease
(COPD), stroke, diabetes, heart disease, or hip fracture and categorizing the mental
disorders into dementia, depression, schizophrenia, and affective and other serious
disorders). Additionally, 16% had both physical and mental diagnoses in 1999, while
24% suffered from both in 2004. Id. Further, in 1999, 23% of recently admitted
residents received help in the 5 Activities of Daily Living (ADLs), while that number
increased to 27% in 2004. Id. at 12.
15. Whitton, supra note 14, at 150-51. Potential residents and their family members
panic when they feel there is insufficient time to consider different facilities and they may
choose a facility they would not have chosen if they had more time to weigh their
options. Id. at 150.
16. See id.; see also Owings & Geller, supra note 9, at 22-23.
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A. Lack of Capacity ofResident to Assent to the Agreement
When a person is admitted to a nursing facility, they may be in a condition
which limits their ability to appreciate the terms of an arbitration agreement.
Formation of a valid contract requires a meeting of the minds, and because
of the resident's condition, the resident may lack the capacity to actually
assent to the terms of the agreement they have signed. In Landers v.
Integrated Health Services of Shreveport, the Louisiana Court of Appeals
upheld the trial court's determination that a nursing facility resident who
"required 24 hour professional nursing supervision and maximum assistance
with her daily needs" and who "was noted to be forgetful, depressed, and
suffering from schizophrenia and paralysis from a cerebrovascular accident"
lacked the capacity to assent to an arbitration agreement.17 By contrast, in
Estate of Etting v. Regents Park at Aventura, Inc., the District Court of
Appeal of Florida found that a nursing facility resident's legal blindness at
the time she signed the agreement was insufficient to render her incapable of
assenting to the agreement.' 8
Evaluating whether a nursing facility resident had the legal capacity to
understand and appreciate the terms of the arbitration provisions in the
contract he or she signed upon admission and not simply the provisions
governing payment, visiting hours, or facility rules, is the vital first step to
deciding whether the contract itself is valid.
B. Lack ofAuthority to Bind Resident to Agreement
Often it is not the resident themselves who signs the arbitration
agreement, but a friend or family member who is helping the resident get
admitted to the nursing facility. In such cases, many courts have separated
the authority to admit the ill person to the facility from the decision to sign a
mandatory pre-dispute arbitration agreement contained within the admission
papers. A person can have actual authority to bind the nursing facility
resident "when, at the time of taking action that has legal consequences for
the principal, the agent reasonably believes, in accordance with the
principal's manifestations to the agent, that the principal wishes the agent so
to act."19  Whereas, the person signing on behalf of the nursing facility
17. Landers v. Integrated Health Servs. of Shreveport, 903 So. 2d 609, 612 (La. Ct.
App. 2005).
18. Estate of Etting v. Regents Park at Aventura, Inc., 891 So. 2d 558, 558 (Fla. Dist.
Ct. App. 2004).
19. RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF AGENCY § 2.01 (2006) (emphasis added).
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resident only has apparent authority "when a third party reasonably believes
the actor has authority to act on behalf of the principal and that belief is
traceable to the principal's manifestations."20 Whether an agent has actual
or apparent authority to bind the resident is often a fact intensive inquiry.
1. Durable Powers ofAttorney and Health Care Proxies
Traditionally, the power of the agent to bind the principal terminated with
the principal's loss of capacity. 2 1 However, a "durable power of attorney" is
an agency relationship that remains valid even when the principal is
22incapacitated. A durable power of attorney is a statutory creation defined
by state law.23 Generally,
to create a durable power of attorney . . . the principal must be
competent at the time the durable power of attorney is created, the
durable power of attorney must be in writing and signed by the
principal, and the principal must express the intention that the
power be durable. 24
The principal has the power to define the scope of the power of attorney,
which can be general-allowing the agent to act to the full extent permitted
by statute-or narrow-limiting the agent to bind the principal only with
25
respect to specific actions. The power of attorney can be immediate,
applying at the time of the agreement, or "springing," applying only when
the principal loses capacity. 2 6
An issue that arises with health care proxies and durable powers of
attorney is whether the principal was in fact incapacitated when the agent
acted on her behalf, as to give the agent authority to bind the nursing facility
resident. For instance, In re Estate of McKibbin held that a resident whose
20. Id. at § 2.03 (emphasis added).
21. Jennifer L. Rhein, No One in Charge: Durable Powers of Attorney and the
Failure to Protect Incapacitated Principals, 17 ELDER L.J. 165, 170 (2009).
22. Id. at 170-71.
23. See Catherine Seal, Power of Attorney: Convenient Contract or Dangerous
Document?, 11 MARQ. ELDER'S ADVISOR 307, 309-12 (2010).
24. Rhein, supra note 21, at 171.
25. Id. at 171-72.
26. Id.
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son presented a durable power of attorney was not bound by the son's
signing of an arbitration agreement because the resident had not been
declared incapacitated nor was there evidence that she was incapacitated and
nothing in the agreement gave the son power to enter into arbitration
agreements on her behalf.2 7 Some states, however, find that one who signs
the agreement as a guardian of the person will bind the resident even in the
absence of express authority to do so.28
Therefore, when advocating on behalf of a party attempting to invalidate
an arbitration agreement signed by an agent given authority through a
durable power of attorney or a health care proxy, an advocate should
evaluate whether the nursing facility documented the principal's
incapacitation at the time that the agent acted on their behalf. Furthermore,
elder law attorneys that draft powers of attorney should be careful to
expressly prohibit a health care decision maker from binding the client to
mandatory pre-dispute arbitration of disputes in long-term care settings.
2. The Authority to Make Health Care Decisions Generally Will Not
Be Sufficient to Authorize the Execution ofan Arbitration
Agreement.
Courts throughout the country are virtually unanimous in declining to
enforce arbitration agreements against an incapacitated nursing facility
resident if the agreement was signed by a person (e.g. family member or
29friend) who does not have express authority to make such an agreement.
27. In re Estate of McKibbin, 977 So. 2d 612, 613 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 2008).
28. See, e.g., Owens v. Coosa Valley Health Care, Inc., 890 So.2d 983, 987 (Ala.
2004) (holding that a resident's daughter, despite not having express power of attorney,
had authority to bind the resident where the daughter signed the agreement as guardian
and sponsor and "[tihere [wa]s no evidence indicating that Tucker had any objection to
Owens's acting on her behalf in admitting Tucker to the nursing home.").
29. E.g., Dickerson v. Longoria, 995 A.2d 721, 737 (Md. 2010) (stating that the
decision to sign a free-standing arbitration agreement is not a health care decision if the
patient may receive health care without signing the arbitration agreement"); Lujan v. Life
Care Ctrs. of Am., 222 P.3d 970, 978 (Colo. App. 2009) ("the power to make life and
death decisions is clearly within the statutory authority provided to a health care proxy . .
. [but] the decision to enter in an arbitration agreement is not"); Life Care Ctrs. of Am. v.
Smith, 681 S.E.2d 182 (Ga. Ct. App. 2009); McNally v. Beverly Enters., 191 P.3d 363
(Kan. App. 2008) (finding that a durable power of attorney for health care did not confer
authority to sign arbitration agreement); Tex. Cityview Care Ctr., L.P. v. Fryer, 227
S.W.3d 345, 352 (Tex. App. 2007) (concluding that holder of medical power of attorney
lacked authority to sign arbitration agreement because nothing in medical power of
attorney indicated it was intended to confer authority to make legal rather than health care
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One particularly illuminating Georgia Court of Appeals case that
demonstrates the separation of health care decisions versus the decision to
waive constitutionally protected rights pursuant to an arbitration agreement
was Life Care Centers ofAmerica v. Smith. That court held that a daughter
who was duly appointed as a health care agent lacked the power to agree to
arbitration.3 0 The court acknowledged that the health care proxy expressly
gave the daughter very broad authority, "so that [the] agent will have
authority to make any decision [the principal] could make to obtain or
terminate any type of health care."3 1 Nevertheless, the court found that this
authority was not so broad as to authorize the daughter to sign away her
32mother's right to a jury trial. Two rare exceptions to this nationwide trend
appear in California decisions, which are difficult to reconcile.
33
C. Arbitration Agreement Does Not Bind Third Parties
A related issue is who may be bound by a resident or their agent signing
an arbitration agreement in a long-term care contract. There are two
separate issues: whether, when the resident themselves sign the arbitration
decisions); Koricic v. Beverly Enter.s-Neb., Inc., 773 N.W.2d 145, 148 (Neb. 2009)
(refusing to compel arbitration because son who signed nursing facility admission
documents on his mother's behalf lacked express authority to agree to arbitrate);
Blankfeld v. Richmond Health Care, 902 So.2d 296, 300-01 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 2005)
(finding that holder of health care proxy did not have authority to bind nursing facility
patient to an arbitration agreement); Miss. Care Ctr. of Greenville, LLC v. Hinyub, 975
So.2d 211, 218 (Miss. 2008) (holding that an arbitration agreement that was not required
as a condition of admission could not be considered a health care decision by health care
surrogate); but see Owens v. Nat'l Health Corp., 263 S.W.3d 876, 884 (Tenn. 2007)
(holding that where arbitration agreement was required as a condition of admission to the
facility, health care agent had authority to sign).
30. Life Care Ctrs. of Am. v. Smith, 681 S.E.2d 182 (Ga. Ct. App. 2009).
31. Id.at185.
32. Id. at 186.
33. Compare, e.g., Garrison v. Superior Court, 33 Cal. Rptr. 3d 350 (Cal. Ct. App.
2005) (finding that holder of a health care power of attorney had the power to agree to
arbitration) with Flores v. Evergreen at San Diego, 55 Cal. Rptr. 3d 823, 829 (Cal. App.
4th 2007) (holding that principal could not be compelled to arbitrate because the
legislature had not specifically conveyed authority over arbitration decisions in health
care proxy legislation).
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agreement, their family members are also bound by that agreement and
whether, when an agent binds the resident, they also bind themselves.
Generally, a person cannot bind another to an arbitration agreement.34
However, there are three exceptions to this rule: agents can bind their
principals so long as there is express authority, spouses can bind one another
as long as there is express authority to do so, and parents can bind their
minor children. 3 5 Therefore, with the possible exception of when a family
member sues as a successor in interest to a deceased nursing facility
resident's cause of action instead of in their own cause of action,3 6 the
resident cannot bind anyone else to the agreement absent the three above-
mentioned circumstances.37
Critically, when an agent binds the principal to the agreement, courts have
typically found that the agent was not acting, and is therefore not bound, in
their personal capacity. For instance, in Goliger v. AMS Properties, Inc., the
court held that because the resident's daughter "was not acting in her
personal capacity when she signed the arbitration agreements, but instead in
her representative capacity as her mother's responsible party . . . no waiver
of [the daughter]'s personal right to a jury trial can be inferred."38 Thus, the
daughter was not bound to the arbitration agreement she signed for her
mother as an agent in her own wrongful death suit. 39
The situation may be quite different in states that consider wrongful death
suits entirely derivative of the decedent's own claims. In Sanford v.
Castleton Health Care Center, LLC, the Indiana Court of Appeals held that
under Indiana law "the only claims that survive a decedent's death are those
that the decedent would have been entitled to bring, or liable to defend
against, during his or her lifetime" and the decedent was bound by an
34. See Buckner v. Tamarin, 119 Cal. Rptr. 2d 489, 490-91 (Cal. Ct. App. 2002).
35. See id. at 491; see also Bolanos v. Khalatian, 283 Cal. Rptr. 209, 211-12 (Cal.
Ct. App. 1991) (holding a patient could bind her unborn child and husband to an
arbitration agreement).
36. See Pagarigan v. Libby Care Ctr., Inc., 120 Cal. Rptr. 2d 892, 894 n.1 (Cal. Ct.
App. 2002) ("The rule may be different, however, when the adult children sue not on
their own cause of action but as successors in interest to the deceased parent's causes of
action.").
37. See Buckner, 119 Cal. Rptr. 2d at 490-91.
38. Goliger v. AMS Prop., Inc., 19 Cal Rptr. 3d 819, 821 (Cal. Ct. App. 2004).
39. See id.
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arbitration agreement with respect to the relevant claims, "regardless of
whether these claims were asserted by [the decedent], while alive, or the
Estate, upon her death, they are not justiciable in a court of law, except as a
review of an arbitral award."40
Similarly, the Supreme Court of Texas reasoned that "[w]hile it is true
that damages for a wrongful death action are for the exclusive benefit of the
beneficiaries and are meant to compensate them for their own personal loss,
the cause of action is still entirely derivative of the decedent's rights," and
held that a decedent's successor is bound by the decedent's arbitration
agreement in the successor's wrongful death suit.4 1
Thus, a resident signing an arbitration agreement cannot typically bind
another person unless they are that person's spouse, parent (if the other
person is a minor), or agent. Additionally, if a person signs an arbitration
agreement as the resident's agent, the signor is not personally bound.
However, in states where wrongful death suits are considered entirely
derivative of the decedent's own claims, the decedent's survivor may be
bound by the resident's assent to the arbitration agreement, assuming that
agreement is valid, whether the resident signed the agreement or the survivor
signed it as the resident's agent.
D. Unconscionable Agreements
Even where a long-term care contract was signed that contained an
arbitration agreement that covers the claim at issue, that agreement may not
be enforceable if it is unconscionable. Unconscionability typically involves
two elements: procedural unconscionability and substantive
unconscionability. Procedural unconscionability concerns the formation of
the contract, with courts often focusing on the relative bargaining powers of
the parties and their ability to understand the terms of the agreement.
Substantive unconscionability relates to the terms of the contract itself and
40. Sanford v. Castleton Health Care Ctr., 813 N.E.2d 411, 421-22 (Ind. Ct. App.
2004).
41. In re Labatt Food Serv., L.P., 279 S.W.3d 640, 646 (2009). This case
disapproved of a lower court case that held wrongful death beneficiaries are not bound by
a decedent's arbitration agreement. Id. at 647 (referencing disapprovingly In re Kepka,
178 S.W.3d 279, 288 (Tex. Ct. App. 2005)). Additionally, the court, reviewing the cases
of the different states, wrote: "[C]ourts in states where wrongful death actions are
recognized as independent and separate causes of action are more likely to hold that the
beneficiaries are not bound by a decedent's agreement to arbitrate . . . while beneficiaries
in states where wrongful death actions are wholly derivative in nature are generally held
to be bound by a decedent's arbitration agreement." Id. (internal citations omitted).
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whether they are unreasonably one-sided. Courts often apply a "shocks the
conscious" test, finding contracts substantively unconscionable if they are so
unfair as to shock the conscious. In applying this test, courts usually require
at least some showing of both procedural and substantive unconscionability
to find a contract is unconscionable. However, the two elements are often
set on a sliding scale relative to each other-the more unconscionable the
procedure, the less unconscionable the substance needs to be and the more
unconscionable the terms of the agreement are, the less of a showing of
procedural unconscionability is needed.42
1. Procedural Unconscionability
Courts appear to be more willing to find the procedure for contract
execution unconscionable where the terms of the arbitration agreement are
not clearly marked or buried within the nursing facility admission
documents, the signor is not given adequate opportunity to read the
agreement, and no attempt is made to explain the terms of the arbitration
agreement.43 Additionally, where the signor lacks knowledge, is illiterate,
suffers cognitive impairment, or the situation is either highly stressful or the
nursing facility does not make signing the agreement optional (i.e., it is
presented on a take-it or leave-it basis or as a contract of adhesion), courts
are more likely to find the procedure unconscionable."
42. See, e.g., Armendariz v. Found. Health Psychcare Servs., Inc., 6 P.3d 669, 690
(Cal. 2000) ("[T]he more substantively oppressive the contract term, the less evidence of
procedural unconscionability is required to come to the conclusion that the term is
unenforceable, and vice versa.").
43. See Woebse v. Health Care & Ret. Corp. of Am., 977 So. 2d 630, 632-33 (Fla.
Dist. Ct. App. 2008) (holding procedure unconscionable where arbitration agreement
contained within thirty-seven page document, no attempt to explain or point out
arbitration agreement was made, no opportunity to read before signing was given, and no
copy of the agreement was provided); Prieto v. Healthcare & Ret. Corp. of Am., 919 So.
2d 531, 532-33 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 2005) (holding procedure unconscionable where
resident's daughter was given package including arbitration agreement while resident was
on the way from hospital to nursing facility, daughter was told to sign before arrival to
have father admitted, and documents were not explained, even where arbitration
agreement was printed in bold and capital letters and daughter was provided three-day
period to review documents and rescind).
44. See Small v. HCF of Perrysburg, Inc., 823 N.E.2d 19, 24 (Ohio Ct. App. 2004)
(holding procedure unconscionable where resident's sixty-nine-year-old wife with no
legal expertise signed unexplained agreement "under a great amount of stress" without
attorney present as husband taken to hospital); Howell v. NHC Healthcare-Fort Sanders,
Inc., 109 S.W.3d 731, 734-35 (Tenn. Ct. App. 2003) (holding procedure unconscionable
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On the other hand, where the arbitration provision is clearly marked, not
in legalese, not a precondition for admission, and the signer is given a period
to rescind the agreement, courts have been less likely to refuse to enforce a
contract on the basis of unconscionability alone without other contract
defenses.4 5 Factors such as a lack of exigent circumstances,46 familiarity
with the nursing facility admission process,4 7 sophistication of the signer,
and adequate attempts by the staff to explain the agreement4 9 may also
weigh against a court finding the procedure unconscionable.
2. Substantive Unconscionability
As noted above, typically an agreement, even if procedurally
unconscionable, will not be found unconscionable unless the terms of that
agreement are themselves unconscionable. In determining substantive
where arbitration clause on tenth page of eleven page agreement in same font as rest of
document that did not adequately explain arbitration procedure presented on a take-it or
leave-it basis to resident's husband who could not read or write even though employee
attempted to explain agreement but did not explain that husband was waiving right to a
jury trial); see also Romano ex rel. Romano v. Manor Care, Inc., 861 So. 2d 59, 63 (Fla.
Dist. Ct. App. 2003) (holding procedure unconscionable in light of significant substantive
unconscionability even though arbitration agreement "not 'hidden in fine print"' where
resident's signing husband was elderly, had no legal training, and arbitration agreement
not pointed out or explained).
45. See Forest Hill Nursing Ctr., Inc. v. McFarlan, 995 So. 2d 775, 785 (Miss Ct.
App. 2008) (finding the procedure not unconscionable where arbitration clause on fifth of
eight pages was not written in legalese, had section heading in bold and all capital letters,
and used bold-faced lettering for the paragraph relinquishing jury trial, signing the
agreement was not a precondition for admission, party had right to seek counsel, and
contract could be rescinded within thirty days).
46. See Bland, ex rel. Coker v. Health Care & Ret. Corp of Am., 927 So. 2d 252, 256
(Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 2006) (ample time to review).
47. See Miller v. Cotter, 863 N.E.2d 537, 545 (Mass. 2007) (stating that the process
of admitting father to nursing facilities "not new" to signer).
48. See id.
49. See Estate of Mooring v. Kindred Nursing Ctrs., No. W2007-02875-COA-R3-
CV, 2009 WL 130184, at *6 (Tenn. Ct. App. 2009) (employee who testified always
informed signer that the arbitration agreement was optional and revocable within thirty
days).
Arbitration Agreements in Long-Term Care Contracts
unconscionability, courts often apply some variation of the "shocks the
conscience" test. For instance, the Supreme Court of Mississippi has stated
that "[w]hen reviewing a contract for substantive unconscionability, we look
within the four corners of an agreement in order to discover any abuses
relating to the specific terms which violate the expectations of, or cause
gross disparity between, contracting parties."5 o
For long-term care agreements, factors favoring a finding of substantive
unconscionability include terms waiving a considerable legal remedy or
procedure, limiting damages, or limiting nursing-facility-specific, state-
created rights.5 1  A finding of substantive unconscionability is also more
likely where the agreement requires the resident to submit to arbitration
while the facility is free to go to court,52 requires the resident to pay costs if
the resident attempts to avoid or challenge the arbitration process,53 or
unreasonably limits the resident's discovery. 54 Simple waiver of a jury trial
50. Vicksburg Partners, L.P. v. Stephens, 911 So. 2d 507, 521 (Miss. 2005); see also
Small v. HCF of Perrysburg, Inc., 823 N.E.2d 19, 23 (Ohio Ct. App. 2004) ("[C]ourts
examining whether a particular limitations clause is substantively unconscionable have
considered the following factors: the fairness of the terms, the charge for the service
rendered, the standard in the industry, and the ability to accurately predict the extent of
future liability.").
51. See Woebse v. Health Care and Ret. Corp of Am., 977 So. 2d 630, 634-35 (Fla.
Dist. Ct. App. 2008) (citing Romano v. Manor Care, Inc., 861 So. 2d 59 (Fla. Dist. Ct.
App. 2003)) (holding as substantively unconscionable an agreement that did "not
vindicate a nursing home resident's statutory rights" because the agreement would not
allow an award of punitive damages); Covenant Health Rehab of Picayune, L.P. v.
Brown, 949 So. 2d 732, 738-9 (Miss. 2007) (holding as substantively unconscionable an
agreement capping damages at $50,000, waiving punitive damages, mandating a one-year
filing limitation regardless of state statute of limitations, waiving facility's criminal
liability, requiring unsuccessful plaintiff to pay facility's costs and attorney's fees, and
requiring forfeiture of all claims except willful acts); Prieto v. Healthcare & Ret. Corp. of
Am., 919 So. 2d 531, 532 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 2005) (holding as substantively
unconscionable an agreement limiting noneconomic damages to $250,000, barring
recovery of punitive damages, attorney's fees, and costs, and imposing discovery limits).
52. See Covenant Health & Rehab. of Picayune, LP v. Estate of Moulds ex rel.
Braddock, 14 So. 3d 695, 702 (Miss. 2009).
53. See Covenant Health & Rehab. of Picayune, LP v. Lumpkin ex rel. Lumpkin, 23
So. 3d 1092, 1099 (Miss. 2009).
54. See Prieto, 919 So. 2d at 532.
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in favor of arbitration, however, is typically not sufficient to find substantive
unconscionability.5 5
E. Agreement Violates Public Policy
Where terms of an arbitration agreement contravene a legislative remedy,
a court may find that those terms are void as contrary to public policy. Such
actions have been particularly effective in Florida, where the state's Nursing
Home Resident's Rights Act (NHRRA)56 provides specific statutory
remedies, and the courts have been loath to allow the NHRRA's remedies to
be contracted away. Florida courts reason that, while parties can typically
contract around a state or federal law, they cannot do so where contracting
around NHIRRA's remedies contravenes the public policy behind the
statute.s? For instance, in Blankfeld v. Richmond Health Care, Inc., an
agreement required that arbitration be "administered by the National Health
Lawyers Association" (NHLA). The court held that because "residents
had to arbitrate under the NHLA rules, some of the remedies provided in the
legislation for negligence would be substantially affected and even
eliminated. The provision requiring arbitration under those rules is
accordingly contrary to the public policy behind the statute and therefore
void."59
F. Agreement Fraudulently Induced
A resident may be able bring fraudulent inducement as a defense to the
enforcement of the agreement if the resident can show that the long-term
55. See, e.g., Slusser ex rel. Slusser v. Life Care Ctrs. of Am., Inc., 977 So. 2d 662,
663 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 2008) (holding "an agreement that provides for arbitration of
claims brought under the Nursing Home Residents Act . . . is not unconscionable simply
because it waives access to the courts to resolve claims arising under the Act."). But see
High v. Capital Senior Living Props. 2-Heatherwood, Inc., 594 F. Supp. 2d 789 (E.D.
Mich. 2008) (holding a waiver of right to a jury trial in a long-term care agreement
unenforceable largely because there was an absence of proof that the resident surrendered
her right to a jury trial).
56. FLA. STAT. ANN. § 400.022 (West 2007).
57. See, e.g., Blankfeld v. Richmond Health Care, Inc., 902 So. 2d 296, 298-99 (Fla.
Dist. Ct. App. 2005).
58. Id. at 297.
59. Id. at 298.
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care facility, knowingly or with utter disregard, misrepresented or omitted a
material fact intending to induce reliance by the resident and the resident
justifiably relied on the misrepresentation.60 In one case, the Fifth Circuit,
applying Mississippi law, held that a material issue of fact existed as to
whether a nursing facility "engaged in fraud-in-the-inducement by having
[an illiterate resident] sign the agreement without properly explaining it to
him." However, other courts have held that where the arbitration
agreement merely contained terms which the signor could have altered had
they bargained to do so, but did not contain any false terms, fraud in the
inducement is not shown.62
G. Courts Can Find the FAA Is Not Applicable In Some Circumstances
While the Supreme Court has found that the FAA is applicable in state
court and extends to the limits of Congress's Commerce Clause powers,
there are still cases where the FAA is not applicable, meaning the state's
laws are not preempted. For instance, in Bruner v. Timberlane Manor
Limited Partnership, the Supreme Court of Oklahoma held that the state's
Nursing Home Care Act, which invalidated any waiver of a right to
commence an action against a nursing facility, was not preempted by the
FAA. 63 The Court laid out a three-part test for the applicability of the FAA:
"The FAA reaches arbitration agreements in contracts evidencing a
transaction that is 1) economic activity; 2) which in aggregate is a general
practice subject to control under the Commerce Clause; and 3) which in
aggregate has a substantial impact on interstate commerce."6 The court
then concluded that the FAA was inapplicable because, despite the fact that
nursing facility care for a fee was an economic activity, it failed the second
and third prong. Even though the nursing facility bought supplies from
out-of-state vendors, used the Internet and long-distance phones, and
60. See 37 C.J.S. Fraud § 13 (2011).
61. Beverly Enters.-Miss. Inc. v. Powell, 244 F. App'x. 577, 577, 579-80 (5th Cir.
2007).
62. See, e.g., Covenant Health & Rehab. of Picayune, LP v. Lumpkin ex rel.
Lumpkin, 23 So. 3d 1092, 1098 (Miss. Ct. App. 2009).
63. Bruner v. Timberlane Manor Ltd. P'ship,155 P.3d 16, 25 (Okla. 2006).
64. Id. at 31.
65. Brunner, 155 P.3d at 31.
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received Medicare and Medicaid payments, it was a local activity that was
not in the aggregate subject to regulation under the Commerce Clause
powers of Congress and did not have a substantial impact on interstate
66commerce.
Further, in Community Care of America of Alabama v. Davis, the court
found that because providing care to patients was a localized intrastate
business activity and the facility was not certified to do business in the state
(and thus, by law, could not force an Alabama court to enforce a contract in
the state), the court would not enforce the agreement.
CONCLUSION
Several courts have acknowledged the need for both judicial and
legislative intervention to address the problems created by arbitration
agreements in the nursing facility context. As one Florida court found,
"[a]rbitration was intended to create a speedy and economically efficient
dispute resolution process for the residents of nursing homes[; i]nstead, it
has tended to create a round of time-consuming, expensive litigation R rior to
whatever dispute resolution method ultimately resolves the case." The
court continued by stating "[t]he judiciary is ill-equipped to provide that
protection, but the Legislature could do so with ease."69
The need for legislative action notwithstanding, courts continue to refuse
to enforce mandatory pre-dispute arbitration agreements against nursing
facility residents throughout the country for a wide variety of reasons.
Advocates should work diligently to protect their clients from these
agreements and strongly urge them to refuse to sign such agreements upon
admission to a nursing or other long-term care facility.
66. Id.
67. Comm. Care of Am. of Alabama v. Davis, 850 So. 2d 283, 286-89 (Ala. 2002).
68. ManorCare Health Servs. v. Stiehl, 22 So. 3d 96, 105 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 2009).
69. Id.
